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Abstract
The standard tax theory result that investment should not be distorted is based
on the assumption that prots are locally bound. In this paper we analyze the
optimal tax policy in a model where rms are internationally mobile. We show
that the optimal policy response to increasing rm mobility may be taxation,
subsidization or non-distortion of the marginal investment, depending on whether
the mobile rms are more or less protable than the average rm in the economy.
Our ndings may contribute to understanding recent tax policy developments in
many OECD countries.
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1 Introduction
Standard optimal tax theory recommends that small open economies should not
levy source-based taxes on the normal return to capital if capital is internationally
mobile, see Gordon (1986) and Sinn (1990). If capital is taxed at source, investment
is distorted and national welfare declines. The literature has therefore proposed
a whole class of investment-neutral tax systems in which (pure) prots can be
taxed without distorting the investment decision. The main characteristic of these
investment-neutral corporate tax systems is that tax payments are zero if the
project return merely equals the cost of capital. In technical terms, this implies
depreciation allowances of 100 per cent of the purchase price of the capital good1,
full deduction of research and development expenditures, full loss-o¤sets etc.
In 1982, the present value of depreciation allowances (PVDA) for an investment
in plant and machinery (unweighted average) across a large number of OECD coun-
tries was 81 per cent, the PVDA for industrial buildings 48 per cent, see Devereux,
Gri¢ th & Klemm (2002). With the exception of Ireland, no country allowed for
immediate depreciation or an equivalent in present value terms, i.e. a PVDA of
100 per cent . Since then, the opening of capital markets and increasing economic
integration among these countries should have increased the cost of distorting in-
vestment. In sum, we should have expected countries to reform their tax system
lowering the taxation of the normal return, i.e. increasing the PVDA.
However, empirical observations do not support the view that governments
pursued this kind of tax policy strategy. Twenty-one years later, in 2003, the un-
weighted average of the PVDA has dropped to 75 per cent for plant and machinery
and to 33 per cent for industrial buildings. At the same time, loss-o¤sets which
are hard to quantify have been increasingly limited, as several empirical studies
report, see e.g. Auerbach (2007). This means that, on average, countries seem to
have taken the opposite direction of what standard optimal tax theory suggests.
In this paper, we present an argument which contributes to explaining this em-
pirically observable development as part of an optimal tax policy. In the presence
1Under residence based taxation of capital income, investment neutrality requires tax depre-
ciation to equal economic depreciation. We focus on source based tax systems as does a large
part of the literature on international taxation because residence based taxes are di¢ cult to
implement.
1
of mobile rms, it may be optimal under certain circumstances to broaden the tax
base, thus distorting investment, when this allows to reduce statutory tax rates,
i.e. to pursue a tax rate cut cum base broadening strategy.
Using the Corporate Tax Data Base provided by the Institute for Fiscal Studies
(IFS) and described and analyzed in Devereux, Gri¢ th & Klemm (2002), gure
1 depicts each change in the statutory tax rates and the PVDA of the OECD
countries enumerated in footnote 2 in the years 1982-2003. The x-axis measures
changes of the tax rate, the y-axis the variation in the tax base. Data points which
are not on the axes present a simultaneous change of the tax rate and the tax base.
Thus, we get four quadrants among which two are (potentially) revenue-neutral,
because the variation of one tax parameter is nancedby the variation of the
other one. In addition, as long as the tax system is on the increasing part of the
La¤er curve, tax reforms in quadrant II are clearly revenue-decreasing and those
in quadrant IV are revenue-increasing.
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Figure 1: Tax reforms in di¤erent OECD countries 1982-2003.
As the gure shows, most tax policy reforms consist of a variation of either the
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tax rate or the tax base, i.e. the data points are located on the axes. Among the
tax reforms which changed the tax rate and the tax base at the same time, only
the Canadian tax reform of 1991 followed the pattern predicted by the standard
theory; however, it just reversed the reform of 1990 to the same extent and may
therefore be interpreted as a mere correction. The only country to implement
a revenue decreasing tax reform of both the tax rate and base is Portugal in
1988, whereas the United States (1992), Finland (1995), France (1996) and Ireland
(2002) implemented revenue increasing tax reforms (quadrant IV).
Most tax reforms which changed tax rate and base simultaneously were of the
tax rate cut cum base broadening kind. Among those are tax reforms in Great
Britain, Germany and Japan, and - probably known best - the US tax reform of
1986. It is striking that even the larger countries, which could be expected to be
relatively autonomous in their tax policy, pursued this kind of strategy. To be
precise, the puzzle is not why these countries lowered the overall tax burden under
conditions of tax competition. The puzzle is rather why they did not choose to
rstly allow for e¢ cient levels of investment by setting the e¤ective marginal tax
rate to zero, before reducing the average tax burden. The former goal would have
required to narrow the tax base instead of broadening it. The question arises how
this development can be explained. There are basically two approaches to explain
this trend.
A rst approach is based on the idea of policy learning, which is extensively
discussed in the political science literature (see e.g. Steinmo, 2003, and Swank &
Steinmo, 2002): Inspired by the fundamental reforms in Great Britain and the US,
policymakers around the world followed their example and adjusted their tax sys-
tem to the new model (e.g. see Whalley, 1990, and Gordon, 1992). The underlying
assumption is that policymakers do not have an explicit model of the economy in
mind and no clear e¢ ciency goals, but they do observe other policymakers and try
to copy their strategies when they observe successful ones.2 The US tax reform of
1986 was considered to be a success in historic dimensions and could have triggered
2Another aspect here is that the US was an important supplier of foreign direct investment
at the time. The foreign tax credit system enables the host country to increase tax rates on US
multinationals up to the US statutory rate without increasing the e¤ective tax rate for these
rms. When the US lowered the tax rates fundamentally, other countries were forced to do the
same if they did not want to push the US rms out of the country (Slemrod, 2004).
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similar reforms in other countries (see diagram 1).
The second approach explains tax rate cut cum base broadening policy as an
optimal response to a changing economic environment. Within this approach,
Devereux, Gri¢ th & Klemm (2002) identify two possible reasons: income shift-
ing and the presence of highly protable multinational rms. Income shifting is
analyzed by Hauer & Schjelderup (2000) who show that, if multinational rms
earn supernormal prots and if the shifting of these prots to low tax countries via
transfer pricing is possible, it is optimal to reduce tax rates and broaden tax bases,
despite the distortion of investment caused by this policy. Fuest & Hemmelgarn
(2005) show that a tax rate cut cum base broadening policy may be optimal in the
presence of income shifting through thin capitalization even if there are no pure
prots. The second argument is rst provided by Bond (2000) who proposes to
interpret the tax rate cut cum base broadening to be the optimal tax policy reac-
tion to the existence of mobile and highly protable rms. Without using a formal
model, he suggests a setting in which multinational companies are assumed to be
very sensitive to the e¤ective average tax rate whereas investment by immobile
rms is relatively insensitive to the e¤ective marginal tax rate. Bond concludes
that a government then might increase domestic investment by lowering the stat-
utory tax rate and accepting a broader tax base, even though this results in a
higher cost of capital.
In this paper, we contribute to the second approach to explaining the trend
towards low tax rates and broad tax bases. Surprisingly, the literature on optimal
corporate tax policy in the presence of internationally mobile rms is very small.
Of course, rm mobility as such has been extensively analyzed in the literature on
foreign direct investment, e.g. Lipsey (2001) and the new economic geography, see
Ottaviano & Thisse (2003) for a survey. There are also several contributions ana-
lyzing intergovernmental competition in corporate tax rates3 with rm mobility,
see e.g. Richter & Wellisch (1996), Boadway, Cu¤ & Marceau (2002) and Fuest
(2005). But, to the best of our knowledge, the only contribution which analyzes
the optimal structure of the corporate tax system in the presence of rm mobility
in a formal model is Osmundsen, Hagen & Schjelderup (1998). These authors con-
sider a model where rms di¤er in mobility costs and tax policy is constrained by
3See Wilson & Wildasin (2004) for a survey of general tax competition issues.
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problems of asymmetric information. Their results and the relation to our analysis
will be dicussed further in section 4.
We analyze the optimal tax policy in the presence of mobile rms in a frame-
work with mobile and immobile rms which may di¤er in protability. The gov-
ernment may use the tax base and the tax rate as policy parameters. In contrast
to Osmundsen et al. (1998), the government cannot use nonlinear taxes to imple-
ment a separating equilibrium where rms reveal their type. Instead, a linear tax
system is considered, which gives rise to a pooling equilibrium. We show that the
mobility of rms across borders does create incentives for governments to deviate
systematically from investment neutrality. The optimal policy depends on how
protable mobile rms are, relative to immobile rms. Essentially, changing the
combination of tax rates and tax bases may be interpreted as a form of price dis-
crimination. If the marginal mobile rm is more protable than the average rm
in the country, a tax rate cut cum base broadening policy is optimal. The reason
is that this policy redistributes the tax burden from mobile to immobile rms.
Thus, mobile rms can be prevented from leaving the country without sacricing
too much tax revenue. But if the marginal mobile rm is less protable than the
average rm in the economy, a tax rate cut cum base broadening policy reduces
welfare. In this case, the optimal tax policy consists of subsidizing the normal
return to capital and increasing the statutory tax rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present
our argument in the framework of a stylized model. In section 3 we discuss how
our results relate to the ndings in the literature and conclude.
2 The model
In this section, we proceed as follows. The next subsection presents the setup of
the model. Subsection 2.2 describes the capital market equilibrium. section 2.3.
derives the optimal tax policy without rm mobility. This serves as a benchmark
for the subsequent analysis. Subsections 2.4 and 2.5 analyse the optimal tax policy
in the presence of rm mobility for the domestic (rm-exporting) government and
the foreign (rm-importing) government, respectively.
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2.1 Setup
Consider a pair of asymmetric countries, domestic and foreign, which are linked
through cross-border migration of rms and a common capital market. The world
consists of a certain number M of these identical country pairs. If M is small, the
countriestax policies have a signicant e¤ect on the world market interest rate.
If M is very large, then this impact approaches zero.
2.1.1 Firms
There are two types of rms in the model which are denoted by an index i = 1; 2.
Firstly, there are internationally immobile rms. The immobile rms have identical
production technologies Q = Q (K1) and Q = Q (K1) and their number per
country is normalized to unity. The superscript  denotes the foreign location. In
addition, there is a given number n of internationally mobile rms which are ini-
tially located in the domestic country. They are owned by the domestic household.
These rms have identical production technologies denoted by F = F (K2) if the
rm locates in the domestic country and F  = F  (K2), if the rm locates abroad.
Internationally mobile rms can choose the foreign location instead of the do-
mestic location.4 If the rm decides to produce abroad, it faces a mobility cost
denoted by c. Moving abroad thus changes output from F (K2) to F  (K2)  c.
Mobile rms di¤er with respect to their mobility costs. We assume that the cost
parameter c is uniformly distributed over the interval fc ; c+g. Each mobile
rm draws a mobility cost from this distribution.
The sequence of decisions made by rms is as follows. In the rst period,
internationally mobile rms rstly choose their location. Given the location, they
determine the size of the capital stock. Immobile rms by denition only make
the second decision. In the second period, production takes place and prots are
distributed to the owners. We assume that, at the end of the second period,
all investment goods have lost their value. This corresponds to full economic
depreciation. Prots are taxed at a domestic rate  or at the foreign rate  ;
4It is often observed that rms invest in more than one country. The reader may think of
production units which are shifted from the domestic to the foreign location but stay within a
multinational rm.
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depending on the location of the rm. In addition, a tax allowance  () as a
fraction of the initial investment K (K) is granted.
Omitting the rm index, since all immobile rms are identical, the market
value of this type of rm is equal to the net present value of cash ows generated
by the rm and can be expressed as
V1 =  K1 + (1  )Q (K1) + K1
1 + r
(1)
where r is the interest rate in the international capital market.5 The optimal
choice of K1 is implied by
QK1 =
1 + r   
1   (2)
Note that, at  = 1 + r, the tax system is neutral with respect to the choice
of the capital stock. Thus, neutrality requires that the full purchase price in
present value terms is deductible from the tax base. Equation (1) then becomes
V1 = (1  ) ( K1 +Q (K1) = (1 + r)). Equivalent expressions can be derived for
the immobile rms in the foreign country, replacing  by  ,  by  etc.
If the internationally mobile rm j locates domestically, it has a market value
of
V2j =  K2j + (1  )F (K2j) + K2j
1 + r
(3)
which implies an optimal investment level at FK2 =
1+r 
1  . Note that the
cost of capital which corresponds to the right hand side expression of the above
equation is the same for both types of rms, internationally mobile and immobile
rms.
If the rm chooses the foreign location its market value is given by
V 2j =  K2j +
(1   )  F   K2j  cj+  K2j
1 + r
(4)
Since cj is an output loss, it is deductible from the corporate tax base. Optimal
investment level is given at F K2 =
1+r 
1  .
Firm allocation is determined by the migration cost cj . A rm is indi¤erent
5Equation (1) implies that there are no residence based taxes on capital income. This will be
discussed further below.
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between the domestic and the foreign location, if the rm values are equal in both
locations, V2 = V 2 . This yields the critical value ~c
:
~c =
[(1   )F    (1 + r    )K2 ]  [(1  )F   (1 + r   )K2]
1    (5)
All rms with a migration cost of c < ~c choose the foreign location. Firms
with c  ~c choose the domestic location. Increasing domestic tax rates increases
~c, d~c

d
= F K2
1  , and thus reduces the number of rms in the domestic location
(note that K2 as well as K2 are chosen to maximize V2 and V

2 , respectively;
given this, the envelope theorem implies that the impact of  on K2 cancels out).
Increasing allowances  increases the number of rms, @~c

@
=   
1 K2 < 0. A
variation in the foreign policy parameters   and  has opposite e¤ects, d~c

d =
 F  ~c K2
1  < 0 and
@~c
@ =

1 K

2 > 0.
2.1.2 Households
Each country is populated by a representative household who lives for two peri-
ods. The utility function of the representative domestic household is given by
U (C1; C2) = u(C1) + C2 + h(G), where C1 and C2 are consumption levels in the
rst and the second period and G is a public consumption good provided in period
2.6 For notational convenience, we omit the country index unless misunderstand-
ings may arise. The functions u(C1) and h(G) are strictly concave, with u0 > 0,
u00 < 0 and h0 > 0, h00  0.
In period 1, the household has an endowment of E units of a numeraire good.
This numeraire good may be transformed into the private consumption good and
the public consumption good on a one to one basis. Households may inject equity
into their rms and borrow or lend in the international capital market at the
interest rate r. There are no residence based taxes on capital income.
The rst period budget constraint of the domestic household is given by
C1 = E   S   [K1 + ncK2 + (n  nc)K2 ] (6)
6We use this quasilinear utility function because it eliminates income e¤ects on savings which
would complicate the analysis without adding further insights.
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where n =
R c+
c  dc
 is the total number of internationally mobile rms and
nc =
R c+
~c dc
 is the number of mobile rms which choose the domestic location.
The second period constraint is
C2 = (1 + r)S + ((1  )Q+ K1) + nc ((1  )F + K2)
+ (n  nc) ((1   ) (F    c) +  K2) (7)
with c = 1
n nc
R ~c
c  c
dc, which can be interpreted as the average mobility cost
of all rms located abroad. Optimal private household savings imply u0 = 1 + r.
The budget constraints of the foreign private households are given by
C1 = E
   S  K1 ; (8)
C2 = (1 + r)S
 + (1   )Q (K1) +  K1 : (9)
These budget constraints reect that the foreign households are only endowed
with immobile rms.
2.1.3 Governments
Finally, consider the two governments. The domestic government provides the
public good G in period 2, which is nanced by corporate taxes collected in period
2. Its budget constraint is given by
G =  [Q  K1 + nc (F   K2)] (10)
The foreign governments budget constraint is given by
G =   (Q   K1 + (n  nc) (F    c   K2)) : (11)
2.2 Capital market equilibrium
The equilibrium on the world capital market requires that total investment, given
by
PM
m=1
 
K1;m + ncK2;m + (n  nc)K2;m +K1;m

, equals total savings, given byPM
m=1
 
Em   C1;m + Em   C1;m

. Using (6) and (8), this implies that the world
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capital market equilibrium satises
MX
m=1
(Sm + S

m) = 0 (12)
i.e. a country can only lend if the other country borrows. As the above equation
determines the world market interest rate, we can now derive the e¤ects of tax
policy on the interest rate. E.g., an increase in the domestic tax rate  has the
following e¤ect on the equilibrium interest rate:
dr
d
=
1+r 
(1 )2

1
QKK
+ nc
1
FKK

+ F K2
1  (K

2  K2)
M
 
@S
@r
+ @S

@r
 (13)
The denominator is unambiguously positive due to the quasi-linearity of the
utility function. Therefore, domestic corporate taxes have a negative impact on
the interest rate if 1+r 
(1 )2

1
QKK
+ nc
1
FKK

+ F K2
1  (K

2  K2) > 0. This term is
equal to zero if  = 1 + r and K2 = K2. If M is very large, the impact of
tax changes of individual countries on the world market interest rate is negligible.
Similar expressions for  ,  and  are derived in appendix 1.
In the next subsection, we start by considering the optimal tax policy, assuming
that mobile rms are not allowed to move to the foreign country. This will serve
as a benchmark case for the subsequent analysis of tax policy in the presence of
rm mobility.
2.3 Optimal tax policy without rm mobility
Assume that rms are not allowed to migrate to the foreign country, i.e. nc =
n. Under tax competition, the domestic government maximizes domestic welfare
W = u(C1) + C2 + h(G) subject to the constraints in (6)-(10) and takes the
tax policy of the other country as given. The timing of decisions is as follows.
Firstly, both governments simultaneously determine their tax policies. Secondly,
the internationally mobile rms choose their location. Thirdly, all rms choose the
optimal size of the capital stock.
The second and third stages are discussed above. We can therefore directly
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turn to the optimal tax policy choices. The rst order condition for the optimal
tax policy of the domestic country can be written as @W
@
= 0 or
0 = (h0   1) ((Q  ^K1) + n (F   ^K2))
+h0^

(QK   ^) @K1
@
+ n (FK   ^) @K2
@

+
@W
@r
@r
@
(14)
where ^ = argmax W . This equation determines the optimal level of  for
the optimally chosen level of , denoted by ^. The rst term on the right hand
side is the gain from reallocating resources from the private to the public sector.
The second term captures the e¤ect of a tax rate increase on the size of the rm
capital stocks. The third term represents the tax policy e¤ect via the interest rate
channel, which is of minor importance if M is large.7
Optimal choice of  implies @W
@
= 0 or
0 =   (h0   1) ^ (K1 + nK2)
+h0^

(QK   ^) @K1
@
+ n (FK   ^) @K2
@

+
@W
@r
@r
@
(15)
where ^ = argmaxW , given the optimally chosen level of  , denoted by ^ .
Using @W
@r
= S + h0^
 
(QK   ^) @K1@r + n (FK   ^) @K2@r

, we show in appendix 2,
that the optimal level of  can be expressed as
^ = 1 + r +
S

0M
(16)
where 
0 > 0 is a scale factor dened in the appendix. Consider rstly the case
of small open economies where M is very large, so that each individual country
has a negligible impact on the world market interest rate. Then, the optimal
depreciation allowance is the full purchase price in present value terms, ^ = 1+ r,
which implies that investment is not distorted and the provision of public goods
is e¢ cient, as follows from (14) and (15).
If M is low and asymmetries between countries yield S; S 6= 0, the picture
changes. If we assume that the domestic country imports capital (S < 0), the
7The expression in (14) allows for tax e¤ects on the interest rate. However, it also includes
case in which the country is price-taker on the international capital market, i.e. if M !1.
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domestic country sets ^ < 1 + r in order to drive down the interest rate, and vice
versa. For the same reason, the foreign government may also have incentives to
deviate from investment neutrality.
We can summarize this in
Proposition 1 Benchmark result: Without rm mobility, a small open eco-
nomy has no incentive to distort investment. Instead, optimal tax policy implies
zero taxation of the marginal investment and e¢ cient provision of public goods. If
the economy has some market power on the international capital market, it taxes
marginal investment if S < 0 and subsidizes it if S > 0.
2.4 Optimal tax policy in the domestic country with rm
mobility
Under tax competition, the domestic government maximizes domestic welfareW =
u(C1)+C2+h(G) subject to the constraints in (6)-(10) and takes the tax policy of
the other countries as given. The rst order condition for the optimal tax policy
of the domestic country can now be written as @W
@
= 0 or
0 = (h0   1) [(Q  ^K1) + nc (F   ^K2)] + h0^

(QK   ^) @K1
@
+ nc (FK   ^) @K2
@

 h0^ (F   ^K2) @~c

@
+
@W
@r
@r
@
(17)
where ^ and ^ are the optimally chosen levels of  and , respectively. The rst
term on the right hand side is the gain from reallocating resources from the private
to the public sector. The second term captures the e¤ect of a tax rate increase on
the size of the rm capital stocks. The third term is the main di¤erence to the case
without rm mobility, see (14), and captures the tax e¤ect on the number of rms.
The fourth term represents the welfare e¤ect of an interest rate change in response
to a tax rate increase. Again, the expression in (17) allows for both assumptions,
the big country (small M) and the small open economy as a price-taker on the
world capital market (large M and @r
@
 0).
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Optimal choice of  implies @W
@
= 0 or
0 =   (h0   1) ^ [K1 + ncK2] + h0^

(QK   ^) @K1
@
+ nc (FK   ^) @K2
@

 h0^ (F   ^K2) @~c

@
+
@W
@r
@r
@
(18)
The rst term depicts the welfare loss due to redistribution of resources from the
public sector to the private sector in the form of higher depreciation allowances. As
above, the second, third and fourth term capture the allowance e¤ect on capital
stock size, rm population and interest rates. The interest rate a¤ects welfare
according to
@W
@r
= S + h0^

(QK   ^) @K1
@r
+ nc (FK   ^) @K2
@r

 h0^ (F   ^K2) @~c

@r
(19)
Using (17), the optimal choice of , denoted by ^, can be expressed as
^ = 1 + r   
1

F
K2
  Q
K1

+
S   h0^ (F   ^K2) @~c@r

2M
(20)
as appendix 3 shows, where 
1;
2 > 0 are some positive factors dened in
the appendix. How can (20) be interpreted? Consider rstly the case of the small
economy, where the last term on the right hand side vanishes. In this case, ^
= 1 + r only emerges if the term in round brackets is zero. The rst term in
the round brackets can be interpreted as the protability of the marginal mobile
rm which locates at home, whereas the second term stands for the protability
of the representative immobile rm.8 Thus, if mobile rms are as protable as
immobile rms, optimal tax policy implies a non-distortion of investment. If,
however, mobile rms are more protable than immobile rms, as is suggested by
the literature cited in the introduction, optimal tax policy implies ^ < 1+ r which
8In the model, the protability of the marginal mobile rm and the average mobile rm are
identical. This is due to the assumption that mobile rms only di¤er in mobility costs, which
implies that their protability only di¤ers if they locate abroad. Therefore, the di¤erence between
marginal and average mobile rms becomes more relevant when we consider the foreign countrys
optimal tax policy.
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means taxation of the marginal investment. Of course, if immobile rms are more
protable on average, the optimal tax policy implies ^ > 1 + r
If the economy has some market power on the international capital market,
the domestic government may have some interest in distorting the interest rate
r. A marginal increase in the interest rate increases interest income or payments
(rst term in the numerator) and potentially a¤ects tax revenue by changing the
number of mobile rms in the economy (second term). The latter e¤ect depends
on the sign of @~c

@r
=
K2 K2
1 ^ , which itself depends on the levels of ^ and ^
.
We can summarize the insights from (20) in
Proposition 2 Non-distortion of investment is an optimal tax strategy of a small
rm exporting country if the protability of the mobile rms is equal to the average
protability in the economy. If mobile rms are more protable than the average,
then marginal investment is taxed, ^ < 1 + r. If, however, the marginal rm is
less protable, investment is subsidized in equilibrium, ^ > 1 + r.
How can a distortion of investment lead to increasing welfare? By broadening
the tax base, the government has room for a further reduction in tax rates (tax
rate cut cum base broadening) and thus redistributes tax liabilities from the mobile
and more protable rms to the immobile and less protable rms. The reason is
that highly protable rms gain more from a tax rate cut than less protable ones.
The government can thus increase overall tax revenues without losing some of the
mobile rms, i.e. it implements a form of price discriminiation. This comes at the
cost of distorting the investment of all rms. But the welfare cost of introducing
a small investment distortion, departing from an equilibrium with undistorted
investment, is negligible. The optimal policy would equalize the marginal welfare
loss resulting from the investment distortion to the marginal gain resulting from
raising more tax revenue.
The opposite case is possible, too. Assume that the representative immobile
rm is more protable than the (marginal) mobile rm. In this case, the govern-
ment wants to redistribute tax liabilities from the less protable rm to the more
protable one. It can do so by narrowing the tax base and increasing the tax rate,
i.e. by subsidizing the marginal investment. Such a tax system hits the prot-
able and immobile rms harder than the non-protable mobile ones. Essentially,
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deviations from investment neutrality may thus be understood as a form of price
discrimination in a second best environment.9
In the next subsection, we ask whether the above derived results carry over to
the case of a rm-importing country, i.e. the foreign country in our model.
2.5 Optimal tax policy in the foreign country with rm
mobility
How does the optimal tax policy in the rm-importing country (here: the foreign
country) look like? The optimal choice of   is implied by @W

@ = 0 or
0 = (h0   1) (Q   ^K1) + h0 (n  nc) (F    c   ^K2)
+h0^ 

(QK   ^)
@K1
@ 
+ (n  nc) (F K   ^)
@K2
@ 

+h0^  (F    ~c   ^K2)
@~c
@ 
+
@W 
@r
@r
@ 
(21)
with
@W 
@r
= S +  

(QK   ^)
@K1
@r
+ (n  nc) (F K   ^)
@K2
@r

+h0^  (F    ~c   ^K2)
@~c
@r
(22)
In contrast to the domestic country, taxation of the internationally mobile rms
does not reduce the households consumption opportunities. It only increases tax
revenue, see the third term on the right hand side. This is known as the foreign
rm ownership e¤ect, see Huizinga & Nielsen (1997). This e¤ect implies that part
of the tax burden is exported to the domestic country, which ceteris paribus gives
an incentive to overtax corporate prots. As a consequence, it may be the case
that public goods are provided e¢ ciently, i.e. h0 = 1.10
9Note that the introduction of a progressive corporate tax system would not solve the problem
since it is the di¤erence in protability which is decisive not the di¤erence in the absolute amounts
of prots.
10We do not discuss the case of h0 < 1 since this implicitly means that lump-sum transfers
from the government to the household are not feasible, which - from our point of view - is not a
plausible assumption.
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The optimal choice of  is determined by
0 =  ^  [(h0   1)K1 + h0 (n  nc)K2 ]
+h0^ 

(QK   ^)
@K1
@
+ (n  nc) (F K   ^)
@K2
@

+h0^  (F    ~c   ^K2)
@~c
@
+
@W 
@r
@r
@
(23)
Appendix 4 shows that, using (21), this equation can be expressed as
^ = 1 + r   
1



F    c
K2
  Q

K1

+
F    ~c
K2
  F
   c
K2

+
S + h0^  (F    ~c   ^K2) @~c

@r

2M
(24)
where 0   < 1, 
1;
2 > 0 are some factors dened in the appendix. Again,
consider rstly the case of a small open economy for which the last term on the
right hand side can be ignored since it does not have any market power on the
international capital market. The optimal choice of  then depends on the expres-
sion in round brackets (third term). As in the case of the rm-exporting country,
^ depends on protability di¤erences between di¤erent types of rms. The rst
term is the protability di¤erence between the average mobile rm and the rep-
resentative immobile rm, the second term captures the di¤erence between the
marginal mobile rm and the average mobile rm. The latter is unambiguously
negative since c   ~c < 0. As shown above, the rm-exporting domestic country
chooses a non-distorting tax system with ^ = 1 + r if the protability di¤erence
between the mobile and the immobile rms is zero. If we apply the same assump-
tion, F

K2
= Q

K1
, the expression in round brackets is reduced to (1 
)c ~c
K2
which is
negative, too.11 Thus, in these cases, the foreign country would choose to subsidize
investment by setting ^ > 1 + r. The reason is that the marginal mobile rm is
less protable than the average rm (of both, immobile and mobile ones). Then,
the government has an incentive to redistribute the tax burden from the marginal
11This is also true, if di¤erent concepts of equal protability are considered. Assuming
F c
K2
= Q

K1
yields c
 ~c
K2
< 0, assuming F
 ~c
K2
= Q

K1
yields (1 
)(c ~c)
K2
< 0. If h0 = 1, which
is possible due to the above mentioned foreign rm ownership e¤ect,  = 0.
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to the intramarginal rms, which can be achieved by narrowing the tax base and
increasing the tax rate. As in the case of the rm-exporting economy, this policy
should be interpreted as a means of price discrimination. If the foreign country
has market power, i.e. if M is low, the foreign government may have the incentive
to manipulate the interest rate, too.
We may summarize this in
Proposition 3 The small open rm-importing economy has an interest to sub-
sidize investment if mobile rms and immobile rms are of equal protability. If
mobile rms are more protable than immobile rms, the optimal policy may tax
or subsidize the marginal investment.
3 Discussion and concluding remarks
The analysis in the preceding section has shown that, under simple assumptions on
rmmobility, the e¢ ciency property of a tax system which is neutral for investment
vanishes. Depending on the relative protability of di¤erent groups of rms, the
optimal tax policy implies a positive tax rate on the marginal investment, or the
opposite. How do our results relate to the ndings of the existing literature?
Our model can be understood as part of the literature that explains distortion-
ary elements in existing tax systems by the lack of appropriate tax instruments.12
In the presence of internationally mobile rms the government would like to dis-
criminate between mobile and immobile rms, if these types of rms di¤er in
protability. The government would set the rm specic tax rate so that each rm
would receive its reservation prot (i.e. the prot it could earn abroad). There
would be no reason to distort investment. However, in this paper we assume that
the government faces informational or political constraints and has no means to
do so directly. Given this, the tax base is used as an instrument for price discrim-
ination.
12Other examples of this literature are the paper by Hauer & Schjelderup (2000) and Fuest &
Hemmelgarn (2005), as discussed in the introductory section. Hong & Smart (2007) show that
tax havens can be e¢ ciency enhancing because they allow mobile rms to lower their e¤ective
tax rate without leaving the country in which they produce.
17
Of course, the basic idea that economic distortions are caused by a lack of
tax instruments is not without issues. If there are informational constraints, in
contrast, one could argue that the government might implement instruments to
separate tax-payers according to the unobservable characteristic. This is the case
in the model presented by Osmundsen et al. (1998). Here, the government cannot
observe rm specic mobility. Therefore, if the government announces high taxes
on immobile rms and low taxes on mobile rms, the immobile rms will mimick
the mobile rms. However, the government can exploit the fact that rms with
high location specic rents and low mobility want to invest more than rms with
low location specic rents and high mobility. Therefore, the optimal tax policy
will induce the mobile rms to invest less than in the rst best. This reduces
the incentives of immobile rms to mimick the mobile ones. One way of doing so
would be to cut depreciation allowances for the mobile rms.
While in Osmundsen et al. (1998) the distortion of investment is used as a
device to separate mobile from immobile rms, we show that the distortion of
investment is equally optimal in a pooling equilibrium if mobile rms are more
protable than the average rm. In our model, the distortion of investment is used
as a redistribution device between mobile rms and immobile ones. Our model
thus relies on a fundamentally di¤erent mechanism than the one by Osmundsen
et al. (1998).
The optimality of the tax rate cut cum base broadening strategy crucially
depends on the relative protability of mobile rms compared to immobile rms.
Helpman, Melitz & Yeaple (2004) develop a model where heterogeneous rms
invest abroad if the gain from avoiding trade costs outweighs the cost of maintaing
multiple production plants (proximity-concentration trade-o¤). In their model,
only the most productive rms in the export sector decide to invest abroad. They
also nd empirical support for their results. Devereux, Gri¢ th & Klemm (2002)
provide evidence for a positive correlation between protability and the probability
of producing in more than one country. Further evidence can be found in Barba
Navaretti & Venables (2004). In terms of our model, this would suggest that the
optimal tax policy predicted by our model would be consistent with the empirically
observed policy.
Finally, one important assumption made in our analysis is the absence of res-
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idence based taxes. In a purely residence based system of capital income taxation,
the domestic government would be able to tax rms owned by domestic residents
irrespective of where they produce. The problem of rm mobility and tax compet-
ition would vanish. Existing tax systems, though, are a mixture of the source and
the residence principle. Most taxes levied at the rm level are e¤ectively source
based taxes13 whereas taxes levied at the household level are mostly residence
based. The interaction between these taxes depends very much on assumptions
on the prevailing system of dividend taxation and the identity of the marginal
shareholder. If the marginal shareholder is an international investor, the results of
the analysis in this paper continue to hold even in the presence of residence based
taxation. If the marginal shareholder is a domestic resident, investment neutrality
requires that tax depreciation equals economic depreciation, see Sinn (1990). The
benchmark tax policy will thus be di¤erent but optimal deviations from invest-
ment neutrality are likely to be driven by the same forces as in our model. This is
a point to be investigated in future research.
To conclude, the analysis in this paper departs from the observation that the
tax rate cut cum base broadening reforms implemented by many countries are hard
to reconcile with the traditional result from optimal tax theory that the e¤ective
tax rate on the marginal investment should be equal to zero. The analysis has
shown that rm mobility may be a reason to deviate from investment neutrality.
The direction of the deviation, though, is ambiguous. Our analysis conrms the
proposition made by Bond (2000) that a tax rate cut cum base broadening policy
may be optimal if mobile rms are highly protable. However, if mobile rms
are less protable than the average in the economy, a tax rate increase cum base
narrowing policy might be optimal, too. This could be true in the presence of high
location-specic rents.
Thus, our model provides an economic rationale for the observed tax policy,
which acts as a complementary explanation next to prot shifting and policy-
learning. For empirical research, our analysis primarily raises the question of
whether more protable rms are more or less sensitive to tax di¤erences across
countries than less protable rms.
13Note that, at the corporate level, most industrialised countries either exempt foreign prots
of domestic rms from domestic taxation or defer domestic taxation until repatriation.
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Appendix 1
In this appendix, the capital market equilibrium is described more precisely. Equi-
librium requires (12) orX
m
(E   C1  K1 + E   C1   [K1 + ncK2 + (n  nc)K2 ]) = 0
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Total di¤erentiation with respect to  , ,   and  yields
dr
d
=
1+r 
(1 )2

1
QKK
+ nc
1
FKK

+ F K2
1  (K

2  K2)
M
 
@S
@r
+ @S

@r

dr
d
=
  
1 

1
QKK
+ nc
1
FKK

  K2
1  (K

2  K2)
M
 
@S
@r
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
@r

dr
d 
=
1+r 
(1 )2

1
Q
KK
+ (n  nc) 1F 
KK

  F  ~c K2
1  (K

2  K2)
M
 
@S
@r
+ @S

@r

dr
d
=
  
1 

1
Q
KK
+ (n  nc) 1F 
KK

+
K2
1  (K

2  K2)
M
 
@S
@r
+ @S

@r

where we have used
@S
@r
+
@S
@r

=   1
1  

1
QKK
+ nc
1
FKK

  1
1   

1
QKK
+ (n  nc) 1
F KK

+
(K2  K2)2
1     
1
u00
  1
u00
as well as @nc
@r
=
K2 K2
1  ,
@nc
@
=  F K2
1  ,
@nc
@
= K2
1  ,
@nc
@ =
F  K2
1    ~c

1  ,
@nc
@ =   
K2
1 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Appendix 2
This appendix derives equation (16) in the text.
The optimality condition for  can be rewritten as
0 = (h0   1) ((Q  ^K1) + n (F   ^K2))
+h0^
1 + r   ^
1  ^
1 + r   ^
(1  ^)2

1
QKK
+ n
1
FKK

+
@W
@r
@r
@
the left hand side of which replaces the right hand side of the modied optim-
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ality condition for :
0 =   (h0   1) ^ (K1 + nK2)
 h0^ 1 + r   ^
1  ^

^
1  ^

1
QKK
+ n
1
FKK

+
@W
@r
@r
@
from which follows
h0^
1 + r   ^
1  ^

1
QKK
+ n
1
FKK

=  1  ^
^
(h0   1) ^ (K1 + nK2)
+
1  ^
^
@W
@r
@r
@
Replace in the equation for  and modify:
0 = (h0   1) (K1 + nK2)

Q+ nF
K1 + nK2
  FK

+

1
^
@r
@
1 + r   ^
1  ^ +
@r
@

@W
@r
If nc = n, the expressions in appendix 1 read drd =
1
M
1+r 
(1 )2

1
QKK
+ nc
1
FKK

=
 
@S
@r
+ @S

@r

and dr
d
=   1
M

1 

1
QKK
+ nc
1
FKK

=
 
@S
@r
+ @S

@r

. It follows that the third term (ex-
pression in round brackets) becomes zero. This implies that public good provision
is e¢ cient: h0   1. Using this result in the optimality condition for , we may
write
@W
@r
@r
@
= h0^
1 + r   ^
1  ^
^
1  ^

1
QKK
+ n
1
FKK

Using the expressions for @W
@r
and @r
@
, this reads as
^ = 1 + r +
S=M 
@S
@r
+ @S

@r

^
1 ^

1 +
1
1 ^

1
QKK
+n 1
FKK

M( @S@r +
@S
@r )

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0 =
 
@S
@r
+ @S

@r

^
1 ^

1 +
1
1 ^

1
QKK
+n 1
FKK

M( @S@r +
@S
@r )

> 0 the equation in the text
follows.
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Appendix 3
This appendix derives equation (20) in the text.
The optimality condition for  can be rewritten as
0 = (h0   1) [(Q  ^K1) + nc (F   ^K2)] + h0^

(QK   ^) @K1
@
+ nc (FK   ^) @K2
@

+
@W
@r
@r
@
  h0 ^
1  ^  (F   ^K2)
2
Now consider the optimality condition for . Multiplying both sides of the
equation by F ^K
^K
gives
0 = (h0   1) [K1 + ncK2] F   ^K2
K2
  h0

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Now replace the last term on the right hand side with the corresponding ex-
pressions out of the above ^ -equation: It follows:
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
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Using appendix 1, we can write
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With the expression for @W
@r
in the text, it follows:
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which can be transformed into
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Appendix 4
This appendix derives equation (24) in the text. The optimality condition for  
can be written as
0 = (h0   1) (Q   ^K1) + h0 (n  nc) (F    c   ^K2)
+h0^ 
(1 + r   ^)2
(1  ^ )3

1
QKK
+ (n  nc) 1
F KK

+
@W 
@r
@r
@ 
 h0 ^

1  ^  (F
   ~c   ^K2)2
Multiplying the optimality condition for  by ^  (
F  ~c ^K2)
K2
, it follows
0 =   [(h0   1)K1 + h0 (n  nc)K2 ]
(F    ~c   ^K2)
K2
+
1
^ 
@W 
@r
@r
@
(F    ~c   ^K2)
K2
 h0 ^

1  ^ 
1 + r   ^
1  ^ 

1
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+ (n  nc) 1
F KK

(F    ~c   ^K2)
K2
+h0
^ 
1  ^  (F
   ~c   ^K2)2
The last term on the right hand side can be replaced by corresponding expres-
sion from the above ^ -equation:
0 =   [(h0   1)K1 + h0 (n  nc)K2 ]
(F    ~c   ^K2)
K2
+(h0   1) (Q   ^K1) + h0 (n  nc) (F    c   ^K2)
 h0 ^

1  ^ 
1 + r   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1  ^ 

1
QKK
+ (n  nc) 1
F KK

(F    ~c   ^K2)
K2
+h0^ 
(1 + r   ^)2
(1  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
1
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+ (n  nc) 1
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
+
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+
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Using appendix 1, we can write
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@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Now, use the expression for @W

@r
in the text and rewrite
0 = [(h0   1)K1 + h0 (n  nc)K2 ]
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which can be expressed as
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We use
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in order to show that
^ = 1 + r   
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